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Security Information 16 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/3
FROM: SR/3-W2B
SUBJECT: Operational Conference with AECAMBISTA 4

1. On 11 November 1953, the undersigned met with AECAMBISTA 4, at our request, for a conference which lasted five hours. The meeting took place in Washington DC and was conducted entirely in Russian.

2. AECAMBISTA 4 inquired about [] [] inasmuch as several matters were left in the air between the two during their meeting earlier in the year. It was explained that [] [] duties have now been assumed by the undersigned.

3. The first portion of the conference was devoted to a general discussion of various facets of Byelorussian history and AECAMBISTA 1 organizational matters. AECAMBISTA 4 related about his organization's inability (and lack of desire) to reach a working agreement with Astrotsky and the BCR. He reiterated that the present two separate organizations arrangement was more desirable than any type of amalgamation. This is preferable according to AECAMBISTA 4, because of the undesirable element within the BCR. The August 1953 meeting between AECAMBISTA 4 and Astrotsky revealed that Astrotsky was anxious to unite the Byelorussian emigration but only on his terms. According to AECAMBISTA 4, the only potential within the BCR of interest to AECAMBISTA 1 is the youthful BCR element located in [] River, New Jersey. This group is entirely inactive politically, [] necessary in [] element, and engages only in social activities.

4. AECAMBISTA 4 offered a variety of information about the activities of the Paris Bloc. He indicated that AECAMBISTA 1 as well as the rest of the members of the Bloc, are amenable to entering the American Committee. The prevalent attitude among the Bloc members, the American Committee has altered its political orientation sufficiently to warrant entry therein by the minorities. However, to date this has been impossible because of the machinations of the Great Russian groups.

He revealed that the American Committee has granted AECAMBISTA 1 an opportunity to utilize the RADIO LIBERATION for broadcasts in the Byelorussian language. Five individuals (one announcer, one secretary, and/or translator and three researchers) will constitute the staff of the Byelorussian section. It was implied that the five were being subsidized on a full-salary basis by the American Committee. J. LIMANOVSKI of New York City and Vincenty ZUK-HRYSKLEVITCH of 237 Brunswick Avenue, Toronto, Canada, have been selected for the research positions. The other names were not revealed except to indicate that the announcer

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would be a female. Initially the Byelorussian section will make only one 15-minute broadcast daily; the material transmitted will be limited to a concerted anti-Bolshevik struggle and will fall within political purview established by the Committee.

5. The primary purpose of AECAMBISTA 4's visit to the United States is to obtain approval from the AECAMBISTA 1 Rada members for entry into the American Committee. A meeting held in New York City on the 7 November 1953 was called to resolve the various differences in this regard. Inclement weather prevented many of the AECAMBISTA 1 leaders from outlying areas in the United States and Canada from attending. Although entry into the American Committee was only preliminarily discussed at this meeting, the Cleveland leaders refused to attend. Instead they sent a delegate who vehemently protested taking any action of this nature which would compromise the minority group's ability to speak out against the proponents of the Federated State.

A commission was appointed at the conclusion of the meeting and delegated authority to prepare a program which would be acceptable to all of the AECAMBISTA 1 members and which will be used as the basis for entry into the American Committee. AECAMBISTA 4, nonetheless, anticipates some resistance from certain AECAMBISTA 1 members, but does not consider this to be an irreconcilable dispute or one which will split AECAMBISTA 1. He does not feel that entry into the American Committee will injure the prestige or compromise AECAMBISTA 1 in any respect.

Another AECAMBISTA 1 convention is scheduled for the latter part of November. All AECAMBISTA 1 delegations, leaders, and members from the United States and Canada have been invited to attend in an effort to resolve the issue conclusively.

6. During his visit to Washington DC, AECAMBISTA 4 plans to keep an appointment with Senator Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey) and Representative Charles E. Kersten (R-Wisconsin) at their request. AECAMBISTA 4 was requested to appear before the Baltic Commission after having volunteered to offer certain supporting documentary evidence in behalf of the Baltic States optimistically hoping that the Baltic States would similarly lend support to the creation of a congressional commission for the various other minorities.

AECAMBISTA 4 also stated that he intended to visit Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr, assistant to the Chief of the USSR desk in the State Department. It is his desire to solicit some type of assistance whereby the Byelorussian emigration would be granted permission and facilities to wage an effective psychological warfare campaign against the Soviets in the Byelorussian SSR. Expressing strong criticism of the United States psychological warfare campaign, AECAMBISTA 4 stated that the United States has not effectively exploited the recent major political changes within the USSR.

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7. At the undersigned's request, operational matters were undertaken next. AECAMBISTA 4 repeated all of the complaints expressed to [] during their May 13 meeting. He reiterated that the policies of our organization were extremely short-sighted and that we were guilty of poor tactical planning.

He re-emphasized the difficulties and problems resulting to AECAMBISTA 1 because of the disintegration of plans for establishing the Political Action and Cadre School. He stated that unless we were completely certain of following through with any of our plans, we should not broach any new ideas because disintegration of plans for new projects caused greater demoralization within AECAMBISTA 1 than the extant apathy resulting from undertaking no activity at all.

The undersigned explained that the commitments were made by Munich in good faith and that it had been our intention to implement these projects. It was indicated that the implementation of these projects was impossible because of circumstances beyond our control and of the need to work within a stricter budget. The matter was dropped at this point.

8. AECAMBISTA 4 inquired as to the possibility of establishing an Area Representative program along the lines proposed by AECAMBISTA 2. It was indicated that the plan submitted by AECAMBISTA 2 was grossly unrealistic and that budget limitations did not permit us to hire four full-time professors, to rent office space for each, to purchase automobiles, et cetera as suggested in AECAMBISTA 2's plan. AECAMBISTA 4 was informed that a modified area representative program was being considered. In view of the relative inactivity of AECAMBISTA's 2 and () it was indicated that they, if amenable to the arrangement, might be utilized as area representatives in Belgium and France, respectively, and that another suitable candidate could be selected for England. The undersigned reiterated that current budget problems did not permit anything but a limited Area Representatives program, also noting that the personnel presently in our employ would have to be utilized more intensively. AECAMBISTA 4 made no further comments in this regard.

9. The major operational issue, i.e. that of utilizing [] in the new AECUOR team, was undertaken next. The undersigned related to AECAMBISTA 4 that we did not deem it advisable, for security reasons, to include [] in the team being formed for 1954 operations. It was indicated to AECAMBISTA 4 that AECAMBISTA 2 refused to procure any additional members for Team III unless we considered using [] and that AECAMBISTA 2 and the Field Case Officers were at an impasse on the issue. AECAMBISTA 4 was informed that AECAMBISTA 2 had requested him to resolve this issue and that AECAMBISTA 2 would abide accordingly.

Initially AECAMBISTA 4 marvelled why he should have any voice in the matter since AECAMBISTA 2 was the AECAMBISTA 1 operations chief. He felt that there must be good reason for AECAMBISTA 2's wanting to include [] in Team III. AECAMBISTA 4 went on to extoll [] virtues and that he himself saw no reason why

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[] should be excluded because of the latter's strong desire to participate in active nationalist work and because of his strong ideological motivations. The undersigned emphasized the necessity for eliminating any and all risks in such undertakings. He was told that our procedures for assessing candidates have exonerated themselves and have proven extremely accurate. AECAMBISTA 4 then stated that he has little faith "in the machines" and that he does not understand why [] [] should have been "suspected of foreign IS connections". He considered this completely absurd and that he would vouch for his nephew's reliability. The undersigned carefully explained that the alleged IS connections were only one of the many reasons why we considered [] [] unsatisfactory for the type of assignment considered. This apparently placated AECAMBISTA 4 somewhat or gave him an opportunity to retreat diplomatically. Although he continued to praise [] [] to the end and to marvel at our reasons for rejecting [] [], he agreed to prepare a letter, per our request, for transmittal to AECAMBISTA 2 (via our channels) authorizing AECAMBISTA 2 to drop [] [] from the new team.

10. The discussion then revolved about the topic of agent training. AECAMBISTA 4 stated that "on the basis of reports received from the inside" he could not reach any other conclusion but that our training and preparation of agents has been inadequate. He recommended that our training program be more intensive. He stated that it was mandatory to have almost as much political indoctrination as tradecraft instruction in order to exploit effectively the agents inside. According to him, our "intelligence take" from the ABQUOR Team II has been meager and of a very low-level nature primarily because of inadequate training. It was pointed out to AECAMBISTA 4 that other complications inside also prevented the procurement of more intelligence information.

Case Officers Comment: From the above and from other hints dropped subtly by AECAMBISTA 4, it was evident that AECAMBISTA 4 was intimately acquainted with most of the operational details. He inquired whether or not we had received any recent word from the team which implied that he was kept an enclave on receipt of all messages. A non-committal answer was given to AECAMBISTA 4 in reply to his query.

11. The undersigned further indicated to AECAMBISTA 4 that we contemplated transferring agent training to PEPRIME if a minimum of three qualified candidates were found, and that training would commence approximately 1 January 1954. AECAMBISTA 4 inquired whether or not we still contemplated using [] [] of New York City as the operational chief in the United States as had been considered during AECAMBISTA 4's discussion with [] []. It was explained that it was undesirable, security-wise, to bring in more people into operations than was absolutely necessary. In view of the fact that the Field Case Officer will continue to have contact with AECAMBISTA 2, as before it was not anticipated that anyone would be required in the United States on a full-time basis for this purpose. It was explained to AECAMBISTA 4 that, if circumstances necessitated, we could employ [] [] on a consultative

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basis. However, we considered that almost everything could be handled through AECAMBISTA 2 as before. AECAMBISTA 4 did not suggest using AECAMBISTA's 5, 11 or anyone else in any "hand-holding" or advisory capacities and did not pursue the subject further.

Case Officers Comment: It is not known why AECAMBISTA 4 dropped the subject and did not insist on a full-time AECAMBISTA 1 representative with the agents during their training in the United States as had been expected. The subject was raised several times at different instances to offer AECAMBISTA 4 ample opportunity to express his views on this matter but elicited no other response than that indicated above. It is the undersigned's opinion that AECAMBISTA 4 was concerned over AECAMBISTA 2's status and activities as a full time salaried employee and that he did not desire to compromise AECAMBISTA 2's stature as the operational chief. It is felt that this can be used to our advantage and will afford us full control over the agents during their training in the United States without sharing their loyalty with a AECAMBISTA 1 representative. If necessary, however, [] can always be used on a consultative basis should the agents desire to confer with an AECAMBISTA 1 representative. It may be desirable, however, to include [] in the agent training program in order to have a qualified AECAMBISTA 1 assistant for future training.

12. AECAMBISTA 4 re-broached the subject of establishing a program whereby Byelorussian scholars would prepare analyses and studies on the Byelorussian question, on the approaches to the Byelorussian problem, and on general topics of Byelorussian historical background. He stated that there were several qualified scholars in the United States who could prepare such studies, but that they were employed as laborers and in janitorial capacities and had little opportunity to undertake scholarly endeavors. The undersigned expressed interest in this project and noted that we were desirous of further ascertaining the qualifications of these individuals. It was indicated to AECAMBISTA 4 that we would consider employing one qualified Byelorussian scholar who would work under our direction in the preparation of such studies. A brief outline to serve as an example of our requirements was submitted to AECAMBISTA 4. Several PRQ's (translated into Russian) were also furnished AECAMBISTA 4 requesting him to procure the desired information. On the basis of information received we would attempt to implement a study group project if we deemed that the candidate was qualified for this task. It was indicated that this was not a commitment to hire anyone but merely an attempt to investigate the possibilities of finding a suitable candidate who would have access to the desired information and was qualified to prepare studies on facets of Byelorussian history as yet undocumented.

13. Returning to the topic of agent recruitment, AECAMBISTA 4 lodged a complaint against our non-utilization of qualified Byelorussian youth in the United States and Canada. According to him, there have been approximately twenty Byelorussians from the Cleveland area who enlisted in the United States Army because of their desire to engage in anti-Communist

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activities. These youths frequently approach their AECAMHISTA 1 leaders requesting active national liberation assignments but have to be constantly declined. He requested us to investigate possibilities of using these candidates from both the United States and Canada before the source dries up.

14. A meeting was scheduled for the subsequent day, 12 November, 1953, on which the undersigned, accompanied by an agency notary public transmitted the remainder (\$5024.50) of the \$10,000 AECAMHISTA 4 death benefit payment. The attached quit-claim statement was signed, witnessed and duly notarized. *(file under)*

15. AECAMHISTA 4 indicated that he anticipates returning to Washington DC in approximately one month at which time he will appear again before the Baltic Commission. He indicated his desire to meet again with the undersigned in order to discuss the study group project further and to transmit the PRQ's. AECAMHISTA 4 was given a Post Office box number in the event he decided to communicate with or use it as a means for forwarding the PRQ's should a return trip to Washington, D.C. be impossible.

16. The following pseudonyms were used:

[] [] [] []
[] [] [] []

[]

[]

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